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Abstract 
I..arry Ball's recent work shows that OECD countries with large and long lasting disinjlations during the 1980s had the 
largest rises in their equilibrium unemployment rates. While supply side factors did not initiate the rises in equilibrium 
unemployment, Ball finds evidence for an interactive relationship between disinjlation and open ended unemployment 
duration. He concludes that the results support the theory that disinjlation has a permanent impact on unemployment 
(hysteresis) over the theory that there is a unique equilibrium rate of unemployment that is invariant to disinjlation (the 
natural rate hypothesis). A hysterisis theory also implies, in addition to trend unemployment 1ates, that trend labour force 
participation should be changed by disinjlation. The study examines changes in trend participation across twenty OECD 
countries between 1980 and 1990 and finds confirmation for the prediction of the hysteresis hypothesis. Countries with 
high disinjlation have the smallest rises in trend labour force participation. Some evidence was found in support of an 
interactive relationship between disinjlation and benefit duration. For a given disinjlation, the greater the duration of 
unemployment benefit payments, the smaller the rise in trend labour fo rce participation. The results of both this study and 
that of Ball raise important issues regarding the current operating structures of monetary policy in New Zealand, based 
as these are on the natural rate hypothesis. 
Why did equilibrium unemployment rise across the Western 
world during the decade of the 1980s? Was it because of 
growing supply-side barriers to the competitive operation of 
the labour market? Was it because of a relative shift in 
demand against unskilled workers? Or was it due to the 
disinflationary macroeconomic policies followed by gov-
ernments? 
The first two are the mainstream explanations advanced 
respectively by Layard et. al . (199 1) and Krugman (1994). 
The last explanation is one tested by Ball (1996) . Having 
obtained data on increases in equilibrium unemployment in 
each of the 20 OECD countries over the decade between 
1980 and 1990, Ball shows that OECD economies with 
larger disinflations between 1980 and 1990 had bigger rises 
in their equilibrium unemployment rates. In addition, longer 
disinflations were found to be associated with larger rises in 
equilibrium unemployment. While supply side factors in the 
labour market were not found to play an initiating role in 
increasing unemployment, Ball finds evidence of an interac-
tive effect between disinflation and open ended unemploy-
ment benefit duration. An open ended benefit system is 
found to magnify the impac~ of disinflation on equilibrium 
unemployment. 
Ball suggests that disinflation impacts on equilibrium unem-
ployment via a path dependence or hysteresis mechanism. 
The story he favours is one where unemployed workers 
construct social networks which lower the costs over time of 
being without work. In Ball's words .. workers who lose their 
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jobs become accustomed to an unemployed lifestyle, stop 
searching for work, and become detached from the labour 
force" (Ball 1996, p. 13). 
Ball 's work casts doubt on the conventional belief that the 
process of reducing inflation has only transitory effects on 
unemployment. More speculatively, it suggests that if an 
OECD country were to pursue an expansionary 
macroeconomic policy which increases inflation this might, 
under some circumstances, lead to permanently lower un-
employment. However, for expansion to lower unemploy-
ment in exactly the same manner, the path dependent re-
sponse must be symmetrical. 
Given the relatively stringent criteria for being classified as 
actively seeking work in most official measures of unem-
ployment, if the unemployed adjust to being jobless in the 
fashion described above one would expect that a significant 
number of these people to exit the labour force. Hence a 
hysteresis theory of OECD unemployment also predicts that 
equilibrium participation rates should be changed by 
disinflation in addition to equilibrium unemployment rates. 
If they are not, it casts doubt on a hysteresis story. 
Having examined data on changes in equilibrium participa-
tion rates for twenty OECD economies over the 1980 to 1990 
period, I find confirmation for the prediction of the hyster-
esis hypothesis. Countries with higher disinflation over the 
1980s had lower growth in trend labour force participation 
rates. However, while significant interactive effects are 
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found between disinflation and benefit duration on one hand 
and trend labour force participation on the other, it is also 
possible that open ended benefits may have a significant 
independent impact on trend participation. In addition in 
some specifications, the degree of union coordination, a 
supply-side variable, has a significant negative impact on 
trend labour force participation. 
Actual and trend participation rates 
The labour force participation rate measures the proportion 
of the working age population actively engaged in the labour 
market. It is the ratio of the employed plus the unemployed 
to the working age population. As a stylised fact , the partici-
pation rate is generally considered to fluctuate pro-cycli-
cally, rising in expansions and declining in contractions. 
Econometric evidence generally confirms this, with some 
suggestion that cyclicity is greater for females than for males 
(see Pencavel 1986:10-13; Killingsworth and Heckrnan 
1986: 122). 
In the longer run, in considering labour supply economists 
have had more to say about hours of work supplied than 
about labour force participation rates. However, the main 
point of interest is that mainstream economic theory predicts 
that there is some equilibrium or trend participation rate 
which should be independent of nominal fluctuations. In 
other words, changes in the inflation rate (positive or nega-
tive disinflation), a nominal shock, should have no signifi-
cant impact on trend labour force participation, a real out-
come. 
Data on labour force participation rates were obtained from 
the OECD for the twenty countries considered by Ball. I To 
construct the change in trend labour force participation rate 
for the period 1980 to 1990 a Hodrick-Prescott trend was 
applied to the data from all countries from 1975 to 1994.2 As 
an alternative measure, the trend adjustment was also ap-
plied to data between 1965 and 1994. In addition to these 
twenty countries, data is available on participation rates for 
Turkey and Iceland. Both these countries had very high 
inflation rates in 1980 (Turkey at 110 percent and Iceland at 
56 percent) and very large disinflations over the decade 
(Turkey 48.2 percent and Iceland 40.9 percent). Because 
they are outliers by a wide margin, and to be consistent with 
Ball, these two economies were omitted from the sample. 
Turkey had a substantial trend fall in participation (-9 .5 
percent) and Iceland a significant rise (3.2 percent) between 
1980 and 1990 (both calculated between 1975 and 1994). 
The dependent variable was constructed by taking the change 
in the trend participation rate for each of the twenty countries 
between 1980 and 1990. The next section examines the 
possible causes. 
Causes of changes in trend participation across 
the OECD 
The change in the trend participation rates between 1980 and 
1990 were calculated for each of the twenty OECD econo-
mies. A range of possible supply-side explanatory variables 
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also used by Ball (1996) were taken from Layard, Nickell 
and Jackrnan (1991) and the OECD (1994). These include: 
- Factors to do with the structure and coordination of labour 
market bargaining (the degree of corporatism, union and 
employer coordination). 
- Government policy influences on the labour market (re-
placement rates, benefit duration, expenditure on active 
labour market programmes as a proportion of average output 
per person) , and; 
-The proportion of the work force unionised. 
On the demand side a variety of measures were taken from 
Ball (1996) and the OECD (1995). These include: 
- Disinflation (the negative of the change in inflation be-
tween 1980 and 1990). 
- The length of the longest disinflation between 1980 and 
1990 (the longest number of consecutive March years be-
tween 1980 and 1990 when inflation declined), and; 
- The square of the length of the longest disinflation. 
The immediate problem which arises in this context is 
undertaking cross-sectional econometric work with limited 
degrees of freedom and a large number of potential explana-
tory variables. The approach followed was to run a series of 
simple regressions using each of the explanatory variables 
separately to investigate the size of the correlation and the 
significance of the t statistics on the coefficient. Regressions 
reported in Table 1 show relatively high negative correla-
tions between changes in trend participation and levels of 
corporatism, union coordination of bargaining and particu-
larly unemployment benefit duration. This is somewhat 
different from Ball ' s conclusions, which showed that simple 
regressions between changes in trend unemployment rates 
and various supply side variables generated very low corre-
lations. However, as in Ball's work, quite strong correlations 
are found between rises in trend participation and various 
measures of disinflation. Regressing changes in trend par-
ticipation against the interactive variables suggests, as in 
Ball's work, that disinflation and benefit duration combined 
have an additional impact in combination in terms of raising 
the significance of the explanatory variable as well as the fit 
of the estimated equation. 
The next step was to include the various significant variables 
in a common equation. While corporatism showed a strong 
correlation and t statistic in the simple regression, it was not 
included in the multiple regression because the full number 
of observations was not available. 
The first set of equations run included the demand variables 
and the two significant supply side measures in a single 
regression explaining trend participation. Results reported 
in Table 2 suggest that disinflation performs better as a 
demand variable, with a higher level of significance and a 
higher fit in the regression including it than that including 
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Table 1. Explaining changes in trend labour force participation rates between 1980-1990, by 
OECDmember 
Supply side 
Replacement rate 
Corporatism 
Union coordination 
Employer coordination 
Benefit duration 
Expenditure on labour market programmes 
Union density 
Demand side 
Disinflation 
Length of longest disinflation 
Length squared of longest disinflation 
Interactive 
R2 
.01 
.22 
.15 
.01 
.39 
.07 
.05 
.21 
.21 
.20 
t statistic on 
explanatory variable 
0.48 
-2.17 
-1.79 
0.42 
-3.38 
-1.12 
-0.94 
-2.16 
-2.21 
-2.09 
N 
19 
19 
20 
20 
20 
19 
19 
20 
20 
20 
Length x benefit duration .45 -3.83 20 
Length squared x benefit duration .33 -2.94 20 
Disinflation x benefit duration .42 -3.6 1 20 
Source: Union density figures were taken as the average of the 1980 and 1990 numbers provided by the OECD ( 1994, Part 
l/, p. 10). All other supply side variables were from Layard, Nickell and Jackman ( 1991) excepting benefit duration from 
Ball ( 1996). All demand side variables were taken from Ball ( 1996). 3 
length of the longest disinflation. In addition, union coordi-
nation reduces to below five percent significance where the 
length of longest disinflation is used as a demand variable. 
Where union coordination is significant, the regressions 
suggest that nationally coordinated unions are successful in 
protecting insiders by continuing to keep outsiders (those 
not in the labour market) out over time. 
Table 2. Supply and demand side variables and 
changes in trend participation 
Intercept 
Disinflation 
Length of longest 
disinflation 
Union coordination 
B;nefit duration 
R 
N 
Equation 1 
6.694 (6.39) 
-0.216 (-3.167) 
-1.03 1 ( -2.54 1) 
-0.682 (-3.685) 
0.679 
20 
Equation 2 
5.795 (5.387) 
-0.440 ( -2.255) 
-0.783 (-1.750) 
-0.682 ( -3.302) 
0.604 
20 
My next step was to run the same regressions but combining 
the demand variable with benefit duration to create one 
interactive variable. The results, presented in Table 3, give 
a stronger t statistic than on either of the two variables 
entered separately and also improve the significance of the 
union coordination variable. There is a small decline in the 
fit (some decline is of course inevitable given that fewer 
variables are involved). Since the interactive equation is also 
a more parsimonious specification, it is probably to be 
favoured over the linear equation. 
Sensitivity analysis 
This section examines the sensitivity of the results along a 
number of dimensions, including an alternative calculation 
of changes in trend labour force participation, the issue of 
causation and the issue of coding unemployment benefits of 
indefinite duration. The qualitative results regarding the 
significance of the disinflation variables are found to be 
remarkably robust to the various sensitivity checks. 
Alternative de-trending 
The dependent variable is calculated from de-trended par-
ticipation between 1975 and 1994. Does using an alternative 
period to de-trend change the qualitative results? As an 
alternative, the dependent variable was calculated de-trending 
from 1965 to 1994 as an alternative. The results are shown 
in Tables 4 and 5. The fits are substantially lower, but in all 
cases, both linear and interactive, the impact of aggregate 
demand remains significant. Again, benefit duration re-
mains significant but union coordination becomes insignifi-
Table 3. Interactive supply and demand side variables and changes in trend participation 
Intercept 
Disinflation x benefit duration 
Length x benefit duration 
U~ion coordination 
R 
N 
Equation 1 
5.620 (5.85 1) 
-0.087 ( -4.803) 
-1.324 (-3.2 17) 
0 .639 
20 
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Equation 2 
5.025 (4.908) 
-0.148 ( -3.949) 
-0.922 ( -2.026) 
0.557 
20 
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Table 4. Supply and demand side variables and changes in trend participation under alternative 
de-trending of labour force participation 
Intercept 
Disinflation 
Length of disinflation squared 
Union coordination 
B2nefit duration 
R 
N 
Equation 1 
5.061 (3.923) 
-0.179 ( -2.122) 
-0.484 (-0.968) 
-0.564 ( -2.4 70) 
0.449 
20 
Equation 2 
4.503 (3.822) 
-0.046 (-2 .167) 
-0.3 12 ( -0.633) 
-0.543 ( -2.380) 
0.454 
20 
Table 5: Interactive supply and demand side variables and changes in trend participation under 
alternative de-trending of labour force participation 
Intercept 
Disinflation x benefit duration 
Length x benefit duration 
U~ion coordination 
R 
N 
Equation 1 
4.054 (3.382) 
-0.067 ( -2.946) 
-0.712 (-1.386) 
0.365 
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cant. The latter result casts a question mark over the effec-
tiveness of the ability of union coordination to exclude 
outsiders from the labour market. 
Causality 
A question arises regarding whether a stronger rise in trend 
participation causes or is caused by lower disinflation or 
whether large falls in inflation are in fact strongly correlated 
with high inflation rates in 1980. One might hypothesize 
that, by obscuring price signals, high inflation rates in 1980 
are associated with lower changes in trend participation over 
the decade. The hypothesis that the change in inflation 
causes the change in trend participation can be tested. It 
implies that if disinflation is split into inflation in 1980 and 
in 1990 in the regression, the coefficients will take on equal 
and opposite signs. This restriction can be readily tested. For 
the 1975-1994 de-trended data, the F test on the restriction 
that when entered separately inflation in 1990 and in 1980 
have the equal and opposite sign took on a value of 3.97, 
within the critical value of 4.38. Therefore the restriction 
cannot be rejected. For the 1965-1994 de-trended data, the F 
test took on a value 0.16, well within the critical value. 
The values of the inflation coefficients in the unrestricted 
equations and their t statistics are shown in Table 6. While 
the F test suggests the restriction can be accepted, inflation 
in 1980 is much more significant than inflation in 1990. Thus 
there is at least some tentative support in favour of the 
relative prices hypothesis. 
Table 6. Coefficients on inflation in the 
unrestricted equations 
1980 inflation 
1990 inflation 
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1975-1994 
de-trending 
1965-1994 
de-trending 
-0.229 (-3.637) -0.175 (-2.012) 
0.0395 (0.363) 0.228 (1.523) 
Equation 2 
3.843 (3.579) 
-0.139 (-3.544) 
-0.375 (-0.785) 
0.448 
20 
Coding open ended benefit systems 
Following both Ball (1996) and La yard, Nickell andJackrnan 
( 1991), indefini te benefit duration is arbitrarily coded at four 
years. How sensitive are the results to changes in the coding 
of open ended benefits? The results are reported in Table 7 
and 8. Econometric experimentation with 6, 10 and 14 years 
shows that qualitative conclusions do not appear to be at all 
sensitive to alternative coding in terms of equations which 
use either the size of disinflation or the longest disinflation. 
Both the duration of unemployment benefits and union 
coordination remained significant at a five percent level. 
There was some tendency for the demand variable to grow 
in size and become slightly more significant as coding of 
indefinite duration increased. Similar results (not reported) 
were found using alternative indefinite coding for the trend 
participation rate changes calculated using 1965-1994 data. 
Table 7. Disioflation coefficients under alternative 
iodefmite unemployment benefit coding 
Coding of open Disinflation 
ended benefits 
6 years 
10 years 
14 years 
-0.233 ( -3.388) 
-0.244 (-3.456) 
-0.248 (-3.463) 
Length 
-0.524 (-2.768) 
-0.585 ( -3.073) 
-0.607 ( -3. 165) 
Table 8. Interactive coefficients under 
alternative indefinite unemployment benefit 
coding 
Coding of open Disinflation x Length x 
ended benefits benefit duration benefit duration 
6 years -0.06 1 (-4.735) -0.109 (-4.066) 
10 years -0.035 ( -4.280) -0.062 (-3 .625) 
14 years -0.024 (-4.016) -0.041 (-3.340) 
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Conclusion 
Findings regarding the causes of changes in trend participa-
tion by OECD economy between 1980 and 1990 support the 
path dependence hypothesis. These findings are consistent 
with Ball's conclusions regarding causes of rising equilib-
rium unemployment across the OECD and thus are further 
support for the belief that path dependence may be of 
macroeconomic importance. Both equilibrium unemploy-
ment and trend participation appear to have responded to the 
disinflation of the 1980s in a manner consistent with hyster-
esis theories and inconsistent with macroeconomic theories 
ranging from real business cycle and new classical monetary 
misperceptions models through to Keynesian and monetar-
ist theories involving adaptive expectations and long run 
monetary neutrality . 
However, my results also differ from Ball 's in some re-
spects. While like Ball, I find some evidence for interactive 
effects between disinflation and unemployment benefits, I 
find more evidence than he for the suggestion that several 
supply-side variables may have played a significant inde-
pendent role in determining longer run labour market out-
comes. In particular, both benefit duration and the level of 
union coordination in the bargaining process have had 
significant negative impacts on trend labour force participa-
tion changes. The evidence regarding the impact of the 
benefit system is somewhat stronger than that for union 
coordination, since under an alternative de-trending proce-
dure for participation, union coordination loses its signifi-
cance. 
The results regarding the significance of aggregate demand, 
Table 9. Main data used 
either linearly or interactively, are substantively robust to 
the sensitivity analysis undertaken. Qualitative conclusions 
regarding the impact of aggregate demand on participation 
are found to be invariant to an alternative de-trending and to 
different methods of coding open ended unemployment 
benefits. In addition, tests cannot reject the restriction that 
the inflation rates in 1980 and 1990 have equal and opposite 
signs, which suggests that causality runs from the change in 
inflation to trend participation. 
In combination with Ball's work, the above results casts 
doubt on the conventional wisdom, which underpins New 
Zealand's Reserve Bank Act and also macroeconomic policy 
followed since 1984, that the process of reducing inflation 
has only transitory effects on the labour market. There do 
appear to be permanent labour market costs of changing the 
inflation rate. The speculative question that then arises is 
whether there are permanent labour market benefits of 
raising the inflation rate by pursuing an expansionary 
macroeconomic policy. The most extreme possibility is that 
the relationship is perfectly asymmetric: reductions in infla-
tion have permanent negative effects on the labour market 
while increases in inflation have no positive effect. There-
fore an activist expansionary policy would be totally ineffec-
tive. This strong corner case seems exceedingly unlikely. 
The work certainly provides one justification for considera-
tion of a more expansionary monetary policy. 
Future Research 
Future work in the area would be valuable. L aurence Ball has 
suggested that disaggregating labour force participation by 
gender and running a similar analysis would be of consider-
Country Participation Participation Disinflation Longest Benefit Union 
change, change disinflation duration coordination 
1965- 1994 1975- 1994 
trend trend 
Australia 2.3 2.6 2.9 2 4 2 
Austria 0.1 0.2 3.0 3 4 3 
Be,lgiurn 0.5 0.3 3.3 4 4 2 
Canada 4.8 4 .4 5.4 4 0.5 1 
Denmark 2.8 2.3 9.7 6 2.5 3 
Finland 1.0 0 .2 5.5 5 4 3 
France -0.7 -1.1 10.2 6 3.75 2 
Germany 0 .7 1.2 2.8 5 4 2 
Ireland - 1.1 -0.4 15.0 7 4 1 
Italy 0.7 0 .6 15.1 7 0.5 2 
Japan 2. 1 2.8 4.7 3 0.5 2 
Netherlands -0.4 0.7 4.0 3 4 2 
NZ -0.9 -1.4 11.0 4 4 2 
Norway 3.6 2.6 6.8 4 1.5 3 
Portugal 2.4 1.3 3.2 3 0.5 2 
Spain -0 .8 -0.3 8.9 8 3.5 2 
Sweden 1.6 0 .4 3.2 4 1.2 3 
UK 4.4 1.3 8.5 3 4 1 
USA 1.4 4 .8 8.1 3 0.5 1 
Switzerland 4.9 6.5 - 1.4 3 1 1 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1996 29 
able interest. While undertaking such a project would re-
quire a substantial data collection exercise, the results would 
be of considerable interest. 
Notes 
l. I am indebted to Peter Sturm and Jorgen Elmskov of the 
OECD for their timely assistance in providing me with the 
data. 
2. I in the smoothing equation was set to 1 ,600. 
3. La yard, Nickell and Jackman do not provide these supply 
side variables for all twenty OECD economies. For union 
coordination, I assumed Portugal took on a value of2 (out of 
either one, two or three), the same as that of Spain, to bring 
observations up to the full complement of twenty. Ball 
provides a number for benefit duration for Portugal, again 
bringing Layard, Nickell and Jackman's data up to the full 
complement. For employer coordination a value of one was 
assumed for Portugal, the same as for Spain, to complete 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman' s data set. Updating other 
supply side variables was less straightforward and was not 
undertaken. 
Appendix: data issues 
The base data on labour force participation rates were 
provided by the OECD from two sources . Peter Sturm from 
the OECD provided a spreadsheet with participation rate 
data for OECD economies with data beginning in 1960 
(exceptions were France and Mexico, where data began in 
1965 and 1987 respectively). The end points of the OECD 
participation rate data set were as follows : 1994 or later (1 3 
countries): United States , Japan, Germany, Canada, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Spain , Sweden, Switzerland, 1993 (five countries) : France, 
Italy , the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway , 1992: Bel-
gium, 1991: Portugal. Data was also available for the period 
1979-1994 from an OECD publication (OECD 1995). In 
most cases it was directly comparable. The former data set 
was updated using the latter numbers. 
Disinflation numbers were taken from the June 1995 OECD 
Economic Outlook. Regarding length of di sinflation, New 
Zealand was re-coded with four years as the longest 
disinflation rather than Ball ' s two. This takes out the impact 
of the supply side shock of the imposition of a goods and 
services tax (GST) of 10 percent in late 1986 and a rise in the 
GST rate during 1989 of 2.5 percent. 
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